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Abstract—Near Field Communication (NFC) enables a mobile
phone to emulate a contactless smart card. This has rein-
vigorated the multiapplication smart card initiative. Trusted
Service Manager (TSM) is an entity that is trusted by all
stakeholders in the proposed and trialled NFC-based smart card
ecosystem. However, TSM-based models have the potential to
create market segregation that might lead to limited or slow
adoption. In addition, all major stakeholders (e.g. Telecom and
banks) are pushing for their own TSM models and this might
hinder deployment. In this paper we present a Collaborative
and Ubiquitous Consumer Oriented Trusted Service Manager
(CO-TSM)-based model that combines different TSM models
while providing scalability to the overall architecture. In addition,
our proposal also provides flexibility to both consumers and
application providers. To support our proposal, we present a
core architecture based on two contrasting approaches: the Issuer
Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM) and the User
Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM). Based on the
core architecture, we then describe our proposal for an applica-
tion download framework and a secure channel protocol. Finally,
the implementation experience and performance measurements
for the secure channel protocol are discussed.
Index Terms—Smart Cards, Near Field Communication,
Trusted Service Manager, GlobalPlatform, Java Card, Multos,
User Centric Smart Cards.
I. INTRODUCTION
Near Field Communication (NFC) technology has brought
new life to multiapplication smart card technology. Despite
there being a substantial number of smart cards in existence
that can support multiple applications, there are not many
deployments that can claim to have applications from multiple
organisations on the same smart card [1]. Initially, there
were some reservations regarding multiapplication smart card
technology [2]–[4]. The smart card industry had numerous
cooperative successes [5, 6] and in the early days of the
multiapplication smart card initiative it was thought that di-
verse organisations would come together to offer their services
via a single smart card. Unfortunately this momentum was
short lived. The Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership (ICOM)
became, and still is, the most prevalent model for smart card-
based services [7].
NFC is a technology that enables a mobile phone to emulate
a smart card. It is not a deployment model that resolves
potential issues with multiapplication smart card initiatives.
The Trusted Service Manager (TSM) architecture was pro-
posed to fill the need for a deployment model. NFC-based
trials have been carried out in around 70 countries [8] and
the most prominent model evaluated is based on the TSM.
At a very simplistic level, a TSM is a trusted authority that
brokers the relationship between a smart card and application
providers. Almost every stakeholder in the smart card industry
can take the role of a TSM. Traditional stakeholders in the
smart card industry are card manufacturers and card issuers
(banks, Telecom, and transport agencies). This is both an
encouraging and a potentially discouraging development, as
it has similarities to ICOM and as such might decelerate the
deployment of any such schemes.
A number of variants for TSM-based models have been
proposed and in each of these proposals the crucial role of
a TSM is argued to be suitable for a particular industry
(e.g. banks, or telecoms). To potentially avoid market frag-
mentation and create consumer-oriented framework, a model
that is convergent and inclusive of all stakeholders including
(especially) consumers1 is required. In this proposal, we offer a
model called the Consumer Oriented Trusted Service Manager
(CO-TSM). It allows any TSM to interact with any other
TSM or Service Provider2 (SP), thus creating a collaborative,
ubiquitous and scalable deployment model. In addition, we
briefly explore few of the existing proposals and smart card
architectures, putting them forward as evidence that our pro-
posed model can be supported by existing technologies with
minimal modifications. We discuss two variants of the CO-
TSM, one based on the ICOM and other based on the User
Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) [7].
The UCOM can be considered as a contrasting approach
to the ICOM. In the UCOM, individual users are given the
“freedom of choice” that basically entitles them to install or
delete any application they require after authorisation from the
respective SPs. An SP has complete control of its application
(but not the smart card on which its application is installed)
and it has to explicitly sanction the application-download to
1In this paper, card users are termed users, consumers, or cardholders. All
of these terms are used interchangeably.
2Service Provider (SP): An entity that has developed a smart card applica-
tion to offer services to its customers. The role of an SP is similar to that of
an application provider in the ICOM.
each user [9]. However, the control of the smart card, as
defined by “freedom of choice,” resides with its user.
A. Contribution
In this paper, our main focus is on TSM-based deployment
models and smart card architectures (i.e. Java Card [10],
GlobalPlatform [11] and Multos [12]). The salient contribu-
tions of this paper are as follows:
1) A discussion of TSM-based models and specially the
GSMA’s proposals
2) The proposed deployment architecture for CO-TSM
3) A detailed description of how a CO-TSM can be deployed
in the ICOM based architecture
4) Proposals for how a CO-TSM can be extended to be
a collaborative and ubiquitous CO-TSM based on the
UCOM architecture
The objective of the paper is to provide a foundation for
CO-TSM and show that alternative models for NFC-based
smart card services are possible, especially the ones that
consider users as crucial stakeholders in any potential future
deployments.
B. Structure of the Paper
Section II discusses the TSM proposal. In section III, we
briefly discuss the GSMA’s TSM deployment models and also
discuss potential issues associated with existing TSM-based
models. In section IV we discuss two potential approaches for
CO-TSM deployment based on ICOM and UCOM proposals.
These proposals also indicate that the smart cards’ core archi-
tecture has matured sufficiently to support new and innovative
proposals like the CO-TSM. In section V, we discuss how the
proposed model can be implemented with minimal changes to
existing proposals. Analysis and future research directions are
detailed in section VI and section VII concludes the paper.
II. TRUSTED SERVICE MANAGER (TSM)
In this section, we discuss the generic architecture for a
Trusted Services Manager (TSM) in the smart card industry.
In NFC trials around the world [8], the principal framework
deployed is an extension of the ICOM model and is referred
as the TSM [13]. It has gained support from the banking and
Telecom sectors [14, 15].
The given TSM architecture is illustrated in Figure 1, which
shows two TSM networks: namely TSM-1 and TSM-2. Each
network has a Mobile Network Operator (MNO), a Card
Issuing Bank (CIB), a Transport Service Operator (TSO) and a
Leisure Centre (LC) as the scheme partners. The TSM acts as a
trusted broker for the corresponding applications on the issued
smart cards. A customer CA receives a smart card (SCA) from
TSM-1. Customer CA would only be able to have applications
on SCA from MNO1, CIB1, TSO1, and LC1. Similarly, CC can
only obtain applications from the respective scheme partners
of TSM-2.
From an operational point of view, the TSM proposal is an
extension of the existing ICOM. In ICOM, smart cards are
issued by a card issuer and this entity manages the security
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LC1
CIB2
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Figure 1. Generic TSM Deployment Architecture
and operational aspects of their cards. A user has to be
a customer of the card issuer to gain a smart card. They
can have applications from other application providers, but
these applications have to be vetted by the card issuer. Each
application provider has to abide by the terms and conditions
(T&Cs) of the relevant card issuer. All activities related to card
management (i.e. application installation, blocking, unblock-
ing, deletion and enforcing security policies) are handled by
the card issuer. In many respects, the TSM proposal in its sim-
plest version is similar to the ICOM. TSM-based deployments
can use different card management frameworks like Multos
and GlobalPlatform: there are no restrictions imposed by the
TSM on the choice of actual Smart Card Operating System
(SCOS) or card management framework. We did not list the
Java Card specification along with Multos and GlobalPlatform
management frameworks, because most of the deployed Java
Cards in the field use GlobalPlatform’s management frame-
work; therefore, discussion on GlobalPlatform’s management
framework implicitly also includes Java Cards.
The rationale behind including an entity that takes the role
of a TSM is to resolve the issues that have plagued ICOMs
in relation to the collaborative deployment of smart cards that
have applications from diverse organisations. Therefore, the
role of the TSM is to create a single (potentially neutral)
entity that provides certain features to facilitate smart card
management operations. Taking a generalised view of the role
of a TSM, it should provide features briefly discussed in the
following sections.
1) Relationship Management: Smart cards have prolifer-
ated in many aspects of modern life. Therefore, there are a
number of SPs that serve their customers via smart cards.
Any proposal for a multiapplication smart card has to include
a mechanism to establish and manage relationships with
SPs. Relationship management enables SPs to deliver their
applications on TSM-managed smart cards that are issued by
respective card issuers. A TSM can also manage more than
one card issuer, thus enabling an SP to establish a relationship
(contractual agreement) with a single TSM, providing the
ability to install its application on smart cards issued by
different card issuers. In addition, the TSM can also facilitate
an SP in application management tasks: installation, deletion,
update, and blocking/unblocking the relevant application.
2) Trust Management: One of the major concerns with
multiapplication smart cards that have applications from dif-
ferent SPs is assuring each SP that the platform and its
applications are secure. Each SP might have a different set
of security requirements: TSMs will ensure that an SP’s
application will only be installed on smart cards that meet
its security requirements. Similarly, the TSM also assures
card issuers that the installed application will not violate their
security policies. Therefore, TSMs act as trusted entities that
manage the security expectations of both SPs and card issuers.
3) Business Management: One of the main motivations for
card issuers to open their smart cards to other applications
is to generate some sort of revenue. The TSM may manage
these business aspects on behalf of the relevant card issuers.
For an SP to get its application on a smart card, it may have to
pay a small fee to the TSM. The fees collected from different
SPs by the TSM might then be transferred to the respective
card issuers after taking a certain commission for managing
the services.
III. MODELS FOR TSM BASED DEPLOYMENT
In this section, we present who will be the TSM into the
GSMA’s proposals for TSM-based deployment models. Due to
space constraints, we the Multos Card Management Architec-
ture [12] and GlobalPlatform’s [17] proposals are not detailed
but they are discussed in subsequent discussions. However,
they will be mentioned in the subsequent discussions.
A. GSMA’s Proposals
The GSMA represents the interests of mobile operators
worldwide. Therefore, to safeguard the MNOs’ stake in any
future TSM-based deployments, the GSMA has published a
couple of white papers [14, 16]. In this paper, we will only
discuss the most recent publication: [16] as it includes the main
discussion points of the [14] along with most recent assestment
of the GSMA about the NFC based services market. The
GSMA proposal puts special emphasis on the role of the MNO
and it also proposes three potential modes listed in subsequent
sections. Dotted lines shown in Figures 2 to 4 represent
the business consideration (i.e. monetary and administrative
consideration) in the proposal and we do not discuss them in
this paper. These considerations are important but beyond of
scope of this paper, which deals with the technical architecture
to support NFC-based smart card services.
1) Mode 1: MNO as TSM: Similar to the simple mode
discussed in the previous section, this section gives complete
control of a TSM to the MNO as depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. GSM Proposal for TSM: Mode 1
2) Mode 2: SP TSM as a Technical Aggregator: In this
mode, the SP TSM acts as a technical aggregator and appli-
cations are installed on the secure element after obtaining the
explicit permission of the MNO (Figure 3). The role of the
SP TSM is to maintain the SP’s relationships with different
MNO-based TSMs. The SP TSM is logically a different
entity that safeguards and manages its relationships with MNO
TSMs. This proposal is put forward to potentially avoid market
segmentation and provide a scalable TSM-based deployment
model. We will return to these issues later in section III-B.
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Figure 3. GSM Proposal for TSM: Mode 2
3) Mode 3: SP TSM as a Technical and Business Aggre-
gator: In this mode, the SP TSM, along with being a technical
aggregator, will also become a business aggregator as shown
in Figure 4. The business aggregator role gives the SP TSM
the right to market and sell the MNO TSM’s services to third
parties. The difference between mode 2 and 3 is the capacity
of an SP TSM to resell the MNO TSM’s business services.
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Figure 4. GSM Proposal for TSM: Mode 3
The mode descriptions in this section show that the TSM
is not only important from the point of view of the technical
management of cards, but also from the business perspective.
Another important point to note is that all three modes dis-
cussed in this section do not include any relationships between
MNO TSMs (i.e. MNO 1 and MNO 2).
We have discussed proposals from two different organi-
sations. While these models are not an exhaustive list, the
variants discussed provide a basic understanding of what these
different organisations are recommending as the best possible
deployment model. Keeping in mind the variants discussed
here, in the next section we examine the shortcomings of
potentially all proposed variants of TSM-based deployment
models.
B. Issues with Proposed TSM and its Deployment Models
Based on the discussion in previous sections, it can be
seen that the TSM for any NFC-based multiapplication smart
card has some important responsibilities. These are the main
reasons why TSM-based models were proposed for multiap-
plication smart cards. In the early days of multiapplication
smart card technology, ICOM was considered adequate and it
assisted in the proliferation of smart card technology. However,
ICOM was also one of the crucial reasons for the deceleration
of the multiapplication smart card initiative [7]. Although TSM
is an extension of ICOM, it is nevertheless a fresh endeavour
to find an amicable solution for all stakeholders in the smart
card industry.
However, most of the proposed variants of TSM-based
deployment models (e.g. GSMA [16], GlobalPlatform [17],
Multos Card Management Architecture [12]) suffer from major
issues that might become an “Achilles heel” and smart card
technology has been in this position before, in the latter part
of the 1990s. In subsequent sections, we will discuss potential
concerns with the existing proposals. This discussion also
provides the rationale for our proposal.
1) Market Segmentation: The TSM architecture is illus-
trated in Figure 1 in which we have two TSM networks:
TSM-1 and TSM-2. Each has a partnership with an MNO,
a CIB, a TSO and an LC. Customer CA who receives a
smart card (SCA) from TSM-1 would only be able to have
applications on SCA from MNO1, CIB1, TSO1, and LC1.
However, if CA does banking with CIB2 that is associated with
TSM-2, she has to either acquire a new smart card from TSM-
2 or change banks, effectively creating market segmentation.
Alternatively, CIB2 has to establish relationships with all
possible TSMs, which might not be practically feasible.
2) Scalability: The limited scalability arises because not
all application providers can establish or manage a relationship
with every possible TSM. Modes 2 and 3 depicted in Figures 3
and 4 attempt to resolve this issue by creating another (logical)
entity termed an SP TSM. The SP TSM’s role is to manage
all relationships between an SP and potentially all TSMs the
SP wants to be associated with. This in our opinion does not
resolve the issue. Whether the SP manages these relationships
itself or the SP TSM (logical entity of SP) manages it for the
SP, in reality, it does not make any difference.
3) Flexibility: To be part of a collaborative scheme offered
by a TSM, SPs might be required to pay a subscription fee.
Therefore, small- or medium-scale organisations like local
libraries, universities, and health centres may not be able to
afford to be associated with a TSM. We consider that such a
barrier would reduce a scheme’s flexibility.
4) Ubiquitousness: Such systems lack true ubiquitousness,
as different countries might opt for having their own indepen-
dent TSMs. Therefore, tourists or business travellers would
face difficulties in acquiring applications (e.g. applications
from a TSO) in a foreign country where they do not have
any presence. It is difficult to assume that a single company
might have global presence in each and every country. In
addition, even if a mobile operator has established relation-
ships with a multitude of MNOs in other countries (e.g. as
done for roaming services) it might be difficult for a user
to download/install applications from the SPs in a foreign
country using roaming style TSMs. Such a potential solution
is not part of the current TSM based proposals; however,
our proposed framework in this paper does facilitate such a
scenario. Other issues related to the existing systems include
ownership privileges, customer loyalty, customer relationship
management, card surface marketing, and potential revenue
generation opportunities as discussed in [2, 4, 7, 18].
5) Consumers: Almost all TSM variants focus exclusively
on industrial stakeholders. We were unable to find any TSM
variants that include consumers as genuine stakeholders in any
potential deployment model. The cause is the core principles
of the ICOM, which also do not focus significantly on con-
sumers. We consider that consumers should be included in
any potential TSM-based deployment model and our proposed
solution gives them a stronger role.
In this entire process of developing an amicable solution
based on TSM proposal, one set of stakeholders that is crucial
to the survival of all other entities in the TSM ecosystem
is missing: the users (consumers) of the system, which we
consider to be a gross oversight. An amicable solution that
includes all stakeholders (including users) would be beneficial
for the success of multiapplication smart card initiatives.
IV. PROPOSED CONSUMER ORIENTED TRUSTED SERVICE
MANAGER BASED MODEL
In this section we discuss the proposed model for a CO-
TSM-based model, along with the challenges and opportunities
offered by the proposal.
A. Proposed Architecture
As pointed out by Porter [19], the crucial elements that
stimulate competition and innovation in an industry are: a) the
threat of new entrants, b) the threat of substitute products
or devices, and c) consumer power (culture). For the smart
card industry, these elements are present in a multitude of
forms. The provision of applications on a mobile phone has
enabled new entrants to venture into traditionally monopolised
industries like the payment sector. Companies like PayPal,
Google or any other third party can offer a mobile payment
service. In addition smart phones, with the inclusion of NFC
functionality, can provide a substitute for traditional smart
card applications like transport ticketing and access control
[20]. Technology savvy consumers require more features on
a device, a need [21] which is successfully fulfilled by high-
end smart phones (e.g. Android handsets). Smart cards are
lagging behind in providing such possibilities. NFC technol-
ogy provides an opportunity for the convergence of different
services on a single smart card but concerns regarding the
exact role of the TSM and who will be the TSM may have
reduced the momentum. The proposed architecture based on
a “Consumer Oriented Trusted Service Manager (CO-TSM)”
enables a highly scalable and flexible alternative. The proposed
architecture is depicted in Figure 5 and explained below.
The CO-TSM-based model enables a user to access/install
an application even if the respective SP is not a member of
the relevant CO-TSMs. In this model, a user (CA) can request
installation of an application from an application provider (e.g.
MNO, CIB, TSO and LC) that is a member of any CO-TSM.
The application installation is still authorised/overseen by the
scheme manager — for example, CO-TSM-1 in Figure 5 is
the scheme manager for SCA as it has issued the smart card
CIB1
MNO1 TSO1
LC1
CIB2MNO2 TSO2
LC2
CO-TSM-1 CO-TSM-2
CIB4 MNO4TSO4
LC4
CIB3 MNO3TSO3
LC3
CO-TSM-4CO-TSM-3
CASCA
Figure 5. Generic Overview of the Model for Consumer Oriented Trusted
Service Manager
to customer CA or manages the card on behalf of the card
issuer. A point to note for an SP to lease an application
to a smart card, the CO-TSMs that are managing both the
application and the smart cards may or may not have an offline
relationship. It can be argued that the CO-TSM also faces with
the scalability issues, as SPs that are associated with any of the
CO-TSM cannot lease their application to the respective smart
card (e.g. SCA). However, it is still comparatively better than
the traditional proposals mentioned in section III (i.e. GSMA
[16], GlobalPlatform [17], and Multos Card Management
Architecture [12]). Individual CO-TSMs in a grouping can be
deployed based on an alternative discussed in section III-A.
The dotted lines in Figure 5 indicate that applications from
different CO-TSMs can be installed to any smart card that is
under the management of any of these CO-TSMs, and it does
not necessarily signify any offline relationships.
The role of the CO-TSM is very similar to that of the
TSM, as discussed in section II except for one crucial feature.
The proposed model enables an application to be installed
even when it is not from a partner, as long as it satisfies the
security/business requirements of the smart card. Similarly,
it provides an assurance to the relevant SP that the smart
card meets its security requirements. In addition, to make
the proposed model flexible it will even allow application
installations from SPs that do not pay the TSM directly for the
service: in such situations it might charge a fee to the card user.
This model also gives users the ability to request an application
installation or deletion and the CO-TSM, in most instances,
will comply with the user’s request. Such a privilege was not
even considered in the proposed TSM framework or any of the
deployment models (e.g. GSMA [16], GlobalPlatform [17],
Multos Card Management Architecture [12]). Salient features
of the CO-TSM will include:
1) A CO-TSM will manage the relationships between card
issuers, SPs and users. The concept of a CO-TSM is to
provide an unbiased broker service that safeguards the
interests of each of the stakeholders. Traditional card
issuers want to keep control of their smart cards, while
SPs issue their applications to as large a population as
possible. Similarly, users want to download and use any
application they require.
2) The CO-TSM becomes a security attestation and valida-
tion broker that is based on a security validation mecha-
nism. The security validation mechanism [7] is based on
the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation and certification
[22], which is a widely accepted security evaluation
scheme in the smart card industry. Security and operation
evaluation by the CC will act as proof that the relevant
smart card meets the SP’s security requirement. However,
the SP can also request online security attestation and
validation proof signed by the respective CO-TSM. This
is to provide a strong assurance of the security features
of the smart card to the respective SP.
3) Each card issuer requires that any installed application
will not damage its issued smart cards. In addition, the
card issuer may also like to charge a fee for application
installation. The assurance of applications’ behaviour can
either be provided by CC evaluation or by the scheme
manager (i.e. the CO-TSM) associated with the SP. The
charging mechanism can involve charging either the SP
or the user and will be decided during the application
installation protocol (section V-C). Instead of the CO-
TSM ensuring the application’s behaviour, protection
mechanisms against malicious applications should be
implemented at the smart card level.
Each CO-TSM can support any deployment model men-
tioned in section III (e.g GSMA). The proposed model does
not concern with who is taking the role of the CO-TSM or
under which deployment model (section III) it is rolled out.
The only crucial point is that it supports the above listed
(modified) features.
For a CO-TSM proposal to become a fully collaborative
and ubiquitous model, it should support the additional require-
ments listed below:
4) A user has the “freedom of choice” to install any ap-
plication she requires, even if the respective SP of the
application is not member of any of the CO-TSMs.
5) A user can acquire (purchase) her own smart card and
this smart card might not have any card issuer. She could
then join a CO-TSM and can delegate the management
of the smart card to it.
The collaborative and ubiquitous CO-TSM does not suffer
from the scalability and flexibility issues discussed previously.
It gives the consumer the true choice to install any application
whether the respective SP is a member of any CO-TSM or
not.
B. Deployment Challenges and Opportunities
The proposed CO-TSM-based model based on the first three
points (section IV-A) in a limited sense enables users’ choice,
giving them the privilege to install any application they might
require — as long as the respective SP has partnered with a
CO-TSM. To do so, the proposed model has to face many
challenges. The CO-TSM takes on responsibility for smart
card security and has to provide assurances to SPs with which
it might have no direct contractual agreement. Therefore,
the smart card architecture has to be adequately modified to
provide such assurances and also safeguard the interests (i.e.
applications and SCOS) of both SPs and card issuers.
The next challenge is associated with the application down-
load processes that initiates communication between the CO-
TSM and the respective SP. The application download process
should provide a secure and trusted protocol, remote secu-
rity attestation and validation and charging mechanisms (fee
payment if applicable). Once the application is downloaded,
it requires a secure and reliable platform that is part of the
smart card architecture. The application can be managed by
the SP including application deletion and blocking/unblocking
operations. In addition, the model should enable the user to
request application installation and deletion as required. The
CO-TSM will follow the requests of the card user and perform
these tasks on her behalf.
The proposed CO-TSM (based on the first three points in
section IV-A) seems like an extension of the existing ICOM-
based proposals. However, the inclusion of the users’ rights
and removal of any previous (offline) partnership between the
respective CO-TSMs and SPs increases the scalability, and
flexibility of the traditional TSM proposal. In addition, if a
CO-TSM supports points four and five (section IV-A) then
the proposal moves closer to a UCOM rather than ICOM.
With regards to supporting such a CO-TSM model, we use our
experience from the development of the UCOM architecture
and adjust it to support the CO-TSM. If the CO-TSM supports
all five points discussed in section IV-A, it will intrinsically
support the ICOM and UCOM together. In subsequent sec-
tions, we explore the pros and cons of deployment of CO-TSM
proposal based on ICOM or UCOM architecture.
C. CO-TSM based on Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership
Model (ICOM)
The ICOM is deeply founded on the notion of centralised
control (i.e. card issuer) and least privileges to users in terms of
application download or deletion. Building a CO-TSM based
on such a model is possible if we consider that CO-TSMs
will form syndicates and let users choose the applications
they require on their smart cards. Such a model requires
three elements: 1) all CO-TSMs establish an offline trust
relationship, 2) SPs have to establish relationships with at
least one of the CO-TSMs that are part of the syndicate and
3) introduces the role of the consumer in the deployment
model in a limited sense. These three requirements create the
same issues discussed in section III-B.
Beside the traditional ICOM proposal, GlobalPlatform has
proposed the GlobalPlatform Consumer-Centric Model (GP-
CCM) [23] that proposes delegation of some privileges to the
individual consumers. This proposal has the potential to be
incorporated as part of the CO-TSM and gives potentially
more freedom to individual consumers. Although complete
specifications for the Consumer-Centric Model are not yet
published (only a white paper has been published on GP-
CCM); however, in this section we discuss the potential CO-
TSM based on this model.
The proposals of hierarchy for the Security Domains and
Supplementary Security Domain Manager [23] can provide a
strong smart card architecture to support different features of
the CO-TSM. These proposals also help increase the rights
of individual users to request installation and deletion of an
application (as sanctioned by the card management authority:
Card Issuer or CO-TSM). The GP-CCM as CO-TSM is a com-
paratively better option than the traditional ICOM architecture.
However, the GP-CCM in its current state does not support
all necessary services and architectural requirements to allow
a collaborative and ubiquitous CO-TSM.
In the Multos deployment model [12], another ICOM based
solution, it is very difficult to add consumer interactions. How-
ever, collaborative and ubiquitous, consumer-oriented TSMs
are possible but they would require extensive modifications.
D. CO-TSM based on User Centric Smart Card Ownership
Model (UCOM)
The User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM)
[7] gives a user complete “freedom of choice” that enables her
to download and delete any application she requires. As the
premise of the UCOM is that there is no centralised security
authority, it creates unique challenges compared to the ICOM.
The solution to most of these challenges requires a robust
smart card architecture that satisfies many of the requirements
and features of the CO-TSM.
The necessary modification to the UCOM is to accommo-
date the card issuer and CO-TSM, which can be achieved by
modifying the Coopetitive Architecture [24]. The Coopetitive
Architecture is based on the UCOM. It takes all the smart card
architectural improvements carried out as part of the UCOM
and includes the traditional TSM and card issuers. In the next
section, we compare the UCOM- and ICOM (including GP-
CCM)-based CO-TSM along with the base model that we have
selected for the CO-TSM smart card architecture in this paper.
V. IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK FOR CO-TSM MODEL
In this section, we discuss the potential implementation
of the CO-TSM-based model’s core components. The im-
plementation solution presented in this section supports both
variants (three- and five-requirement supporting CO-TSM),
which makes this solution the preferable option.
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A. Smart Card Architecture
The proposed smart card architecture to support the CO-
TSM-based model shown in Figure 6 is a modified version of
the Coopetitive Smart Card (CSC) [25]. The CSC architecture
is an extension of the GlobalPlatform specification for smart
5) Request user authentication and 
initiate secure protocol
6) User authentication and 
establishment secure protocol
Card IssuerService Provider Smart Card Evaluation Authority
1) Optain smart card evaluated by a 
trusted third party
CO-TSM
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3) Request SP’s application
4) Request SP’s application on user’s behalf
7) Request remote 
attestation and validation
7) Request proof generation for 
remote attestation and validation
8) Proof of smart card’s security
11) Activated the application
11) Application activated
10) Fee charging request
9) Application Download
Figure 7. Application Installation Process
cards and UCOM architecture. The following discussion is
restricted to those sections of the model that are modified to
accommodate the proposed CO-TSM-based model.
Above the hardware layer, there is a new entity called the
“Trusted Environment & Execution Manager (TEM)” [26]
that basically provides a trusted computing platform for smart
cards. The remote attestation and validation mechanism is
based on the TEM and it is explained in detail in [27]–[29].
The platform space has platform-specific services including
application installation, card privileges and subscription man-
ager. The CO-TSM and card issuer’s space are two (logically)
separate application areas. These areas are under the respective
control of the CO-TSM and the card issuer. All application
management operations (i.e. card content management opera-
tions) including installation, deletion and blocking/unblocking
of applications are controlled by the respective subscription
managers of each of these application areas. The subscription
manager provides a secure mechanism to the respective CO-
TSM and card issuer to manage their applications areas.
The card privileges manager enforces any policies defined
by the card issuer in relation to the CO-TSM’s space (e.g.
whether CO-TSMs have to get explicit permission before any
application installation or deletion operation). All application
management operations related to the card issuer space are
under the control of the card issuer — making this space em-
ulate an ICOM-based architecture. In the card issuer space, the
card issuer can install or delete any application as necessary.
Neither the user nor the CO-TSM has any control in this space.
B. Application Installation Process
A card issuer will acquire smart cards from a card man-
ufacturer, which has the smart cards certified by a trusted
third party (e.g. Common Criteria evaluation laboratory) as
represented by message 1 in Figure 7. On successful comple-
tion of the evaluation, the evaluation laboratory will issue a
(cryptographic) certificate3 to the smart card stipulating the
security functionality (represented by message 2 in Figure
7). The card issuer will issue certified smart cards that are
under the management of the CO-TSM to its customers. The
application installation process initiates when the user requests
application installation: the message sequence starting from
the third message as depicted in Figure 7 and described below.
3) The smart card creates an application installation request
based on the information provided by the user. The in-
formation includes the application and SP identifier along
with the URL of the SP’s application download server
(from where a smart card downloads the SP’s respective
application).
4) The CO-TSM connects with the SP on behalf of the smart
card and its user. This connection registers the request for
application download onto the relevant smart card.
5) The SP then requests the user to authenticate, to validate
whether the user is allowed to download the application or
not. In addition, the SP also initiates the secure channel
protocol.
6) A secure channel is established between the smart card and
SP, after user authentication.
7) The SP requests the smart card to provide security attesta-
tion and validation proof, which is required to assure the
SP that the smart card meets the security requirements of
the SP and its current state is the same as it was at the
time of third party evaluation certification. The smart card
requests the CO-TSM to initiate the attestation process and
on successful completion, it generates a security proof.
8) The proof is then communicated to the SP, which can
independently verify it, and if it trusts the evaluation
3At present the certification bodies, based on the results of evaluation
laboratories, only issue a paper-based certificate. However, proposals like
those of Dusart and Sauveron [30], and Akram et al. [27] can be deployed to
incorporate a digital (cryptographic) certificate.
certification authority it will accept the proof.
9) After verifying the evaluation certificate and attestation
proof, the SP will proceed with the application download
process to the respective smart card.
10) Once the application download is completed, the SP will
request activation of the application. This may require
payment of a CO-TSM fee for application installation.
Either the SP or the user can take the charge.
11) Finally, the CO-TSM instructs the card to activate the
application and once activated, it can communicate with
the SP to confirm its status.
C. Application Installation Protocol
To achieve a practical implementation of the above process,
we have modified a variant of Secure and Trusted Channel
Protocol (STCP) that is detailed in [24]. For the remote
attestation and validation mechanism, we have included the
proposal in [28] in the modified protocol. The variant that
we have modified is termed an “Application and Contractual
Agreement Protocol (ACAP) [24]”. This protocol not only
establishes a secure and trusted channel but also generates
a contractual agreement between the communicating parties
along with managing any financial transactions among them.
The Authentication and Key Exchange (AKE) phase of the
ACAP authenticates the user to the SP and also establishes
a secure and trusted channel. The contract phase of the
ACAP establishes a contractual agreement between the SP
and CO-TSM (on behalf of the smart card). This agreement
includes the Application Lease Policy (ALP) and smart card
security policy. The ALP details the security and operational
requirements that a smart card has to meet to install the
application. The security policy stipulates the security and
operational policy of the smart card that every application
has to abide by. Finally, the charge phase negotiates who is
going to be charged and how they are going to pay the fee.
Performance measurements of all of these three phases are
provided in Table I.
The architecture of the ACAP test-bed is based upon three
entities: a smart card, an SP and two CO-TSMs. The entities
SP and CO-TSM are implemented on a laptop with a 1.83
GHz processor, and 2 GB of RAM, running on Windows
XP. The smart card entity is implemented on a 16-bit Java
Card. The performance measures are taken from two different
16-bit Java Cards. For comparison, we have selected the
SSL performance measured by Pascal Urien [31], TLS from
Urien and Elrharbi [32], and (public key based) Kerberos by
Harbitter and Menascé [33].
The rationale behind the choice of SSL and TLS for com-
parison lies in the GlobalPlatform specification [34], which
specifies the adoption of TLS for NFC-based mobile service
architecture. By comparison, the public key-based Kerberos is
suitable for the Multos application management architecture
[35]. Table I shows that the proposed protocol performs better
than other listed protocols when we take in to consideration
that these measurements include the time taken by the online
attestation mechanism. All other protocols discussed provide
neither an attestation feature nor any contractual and charge
phase. Furthermore, the ACAP protocol was evaluated using
CasperFDR [36] and no feasible attack(s) were identified.
VI. ANALYSIS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTION
The basic concerns with TSM-based models are market
segmentation, limited scalability and flexibility, ubiquitousness
and lack of consumer involvement (as discussed in section
III-B). The design of the CO-TSM based model was to rectify
all these concerns while keeping the basic architecture of the
TSM intact. The proposal does not completely disassociate
itself from ICOM or TSM: it includes the consumers in these
architectures.
The proposed model, to a very large extent, enables a
user to have a much broader choice of applications compared
to other proposals including both the UCOM and the GP-
CCM. Including users and bringing in the concept of security
evaluation closely coupled with remote attestation assisted by
trusted computing platforms has enabled the proposal to be
scalable, flexible and ubiquitous. In addition, this model does
not give preference to any stakeholder for the role of card
issuer or CO-TSM. As long as the CO-TSM complies with
the listed features discussed in section IV-A, the overall model
does not create any segmentation in the market.
A preliminary application installation process was described
in this paper, but we consider that the proposed smart card
architecture requires additional focus. This focus includes the
management of spaces that encompass user domains (Glob-
alPlatform application domains). However, the concept of how
the management of spaces and applications can be carried out
independently, with spaces managed by CO-TSM/card-issuer
and application domains by respective SPs, is not explored in
detail. Further refinement and evaluation is also required for
the trusted computing platform for smart cards and how it can
assist our proposed model.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the existing TSM proposal
and described the rationale behind it. We then extended our
discussion to include proposals by GSMA for TSM-based
deployment models that compete with proposals put forward
or based upon GlobalPlatform and Multos Card Manage-
ment Architecture, and the concerns associated with these
divergent TSM approaches. The objective of discussing the
concerns related to TSMs was to highlight issues that can
decelerate commercial adoption and to provide a rationale
for our proposal. In subsequent sections we described our
proposed entity, referred to as CO-TSM, and its associated
deployment model. We listed salient features of the CO-TSM
and two potential scenarios of its deployment: CO-TSM based
on ICOM and CO-TSM based on UCOM architecture. The
main differentiator between these two scenarios is the degree
of consumer inclusiveness to avoid market segmentation and
saleability issues. We selected the UCOM based architecture
as the preferable deployment model for the CO-TSM as it
intrinsically supports both scenarios and it makes the proposal
Table I
PROTOCOL PERFORMANCE MEASURES (MILLISECONDS)`````````Phases
Protocols SSL [31] TLS [32] Kerberos [33] ACAPCard One Card Two
32-bit 32-bit 32-bit 16-bit 16-bit
AKE Phase 4200 4300 4240 4347 4296
Contract Phase - - - 1325 1924
Charge Phase - - - 1587 1540
Total - - - 7259 7760
a fully collaborative and ubiquitous solution. Furthermore,
to support the proposed model, we provided implementation
details of technical components that included smart card ar-
chitecture, security evaluation, certification, attestation and the
application installation process. Performance measurements
for a modified ACAP protocol to support the proposed model
were then presented.
Finally, we have demonstrated that there are potential in-
novative alternatives to existing TSM deployment models that
should be considered for future commercial roll-outs.
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